Research Papers and Editorials
The Fall of the Puppet: The War in Afghanistan was a research paper I wrote in my last year of middle school on the situation in Afghanistan. To view the bibliography, please click the link below.
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The Fall of the Puppet: The War in Afghanistan
A Research Paper by Garam Noh
Tragedy tears hearts apart on both sides. Each man fights not for the bigger ideals he represents, but for the family he has waiting back home. To earn the privilege of seeing their wives and children once again, these men will bloody their hands in a conflict that has long lost its meaning. One man has pale skin and blond hair, blue eyes. The other has dark skin, black hair, and brown eyes. They are two different men, both stereotypically representative of each of their nations. But the sorrow their eyes share is the same. This is the war in Afghanistan, a war that has made both sides suffer the consequences of meaningless violence, a war fought by two troops that have both lost sight of their original goal. Today, both nations cannot see that what they are searching for can no longer be found through this bloodshed. The war in Afghanistan, a pursuit that has already been fulfilled, should be abandoned to make way for more effective social reform.
As Adam Berger says in his article, “Afghanistan: An Overview,” terrorism’s roots in Afghanistan can be traced back to the Soviet Union and the war on communism. In December of 1979, the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan, killing the Afghan president and forcibly setting up a new government. The U. S. helped the Afghan resistance movement fight the Soviet Union, fearing the Soviet empire would extend its reaches even further into South Asia. But what was a political war for the U. S. was a religious one for the Afghanis. (Berger) The Afghani fighters considered themselves Mujahideen, or those who take part in holy war, and the struggle against the atheist Soviet Union was dubbed a “jihad,” or “a war for religious reasons or motivations” (Berger). This gave the Afghanis a sense of solidarity and a common goal. With the help of both indigenous and foreign forces, as well as ample international funding, Afghanistan won the struggle. But this war was what left Afghanistan disorganized, and allowed the birth of terrorist organizations on Afghan soil, such as Osama bin Laden’s group, the al-Qaeda. This terrorist organization began when foreign soldiers who had taken part in the effort against the Soviets came together, while the international funding that its members enjoyed during and after the war gave the group the means to settle down on Afghan land. To understand the war in Afghanistan today, one must understand that the motivations for the war came into existence years ago, and that the obstacles the Soviets faced in their conquest then are what American soldiers face today. (Berger)
The aftermath of Afghanistan’s struggle against the Soviet Union mutated into the War on Terror in Afghanistan today. As Adam Berger mentions in “Afghanistan: An Overview,” after the Soviet Union retreated, civil disorder ensued, giving the Taliban an advantage when they first came into power- as factions of the Mujahideen struggled for power in the newly freed Afghan government, the Taliban emerged triumphant (Berger). As Adam Berger wrote in his article, “By 1996, the Taliban was in control of most of the country, enforcing its conservative interpretation of Islamic law.” Meanwhile, the al-Qaeda, led by the infamous Osama bin Laden, instead focused on the goal of “ridding Muslim nations of what they considered to have been corrupting foreign influences.” (Berger) Berger claims that only since the Soviet Union had retreated from Afghan soil did the U. S. became the al-Qaeda’s main target, leading up to the devastating terrorist attacks on both New York and Washington D. C. on September 11th, 2001 (Berger). To protect national security and take punitive measures for the tragedy that September, the U. S. demanded that the Taliban hand over the al-Qaeda members under their protection, but the Taliban refused (qtd. in Berger). Consequently, the U. S. launched Operation Enduring Freedom on October 7th, 2001, with the goal of ousting the Taliban regime and uprooting the al-Qaeda empire in Afghanistan (Berger). The Anti-Taliban Northern Alliance, with support from the U. S. -led coalition, drove the Taliban from the nation’s capital by December of the same year (qtd. in Berger). In 2004, Hamid Karzai, an Afghani, was democratically elected the president of the country, though only in name; the new democratic government, instilled by the influence of the U. S., has limited power only in the capital city of Kabul, and the does not even have “an independent army capable of protecting it” (Berger). In fact, the central government’s power only dwindles the further one gets from the capital, and the “Taliban has seen a resurgence, both in terms of popularity and military might.” The Taliban have this advantage because they are indigenous, and because they respect the fact that Afghanistan has traditionally been largely governed on the local scale. The U. S. still remains today mainly to eradicate the Taliban completely from Afghanistan, a country whose citizens in fact prefer the Taliban to the U. S. -supported government. (Cushman) As a fallback, the U. S. also claims that it is fighting the social injustices against women encouraged by Sharia law (Zoltán). But we need to ask ourselves: Does the war the U. S. is currently fighting call for the use of bullets and weaponry, or that of social reform and education?
It is imperative for the U. S. to realize that its invasion of Afghanistan has already reached its goal, and that it has lost sight of its original purpose for occupying the country. In fact, the al-Qaeda has largely lost its influence in Afghanistan, though indeed the U. S. has still failed to locate many high-level al-Qaeda leaders and operatives (Berger). For about a decade, the U. S. has barely made any progress, and it is now foolish to think that this state of stagnancy will change in the future. As Ames Cushman states in his article, “Counterpoint: The U. S. Should Withdraw its Military from Afghanistan,” the only opposing force against the U. S. that remains in Afghanistan is the Taliban, which does not demonstrate any wish to retaliate, but instead expresses its wishes for a peaceful resolution to this war. The Taliban, too, was driven from “main population centers” by mid-December 2001, and “have… repeatedly stated that they have no interest in exporting terrorism or waging jihad beyond their borders if foreign forces leave” (Cushman). The al-Qaeda and the Taliban are not one and the same, and definitely are not interchangeable terms. Though many people were under the impression that the al-Qaeda was acting in accordance with the Taliban’s wishes, “the al-Qaeda operations and training network operated more at the sufferance of the Taliban than at the direction of it…” (Cushman) In fact, the U.S.’s invasion may not have even taken place if not for the Taliban’s pride: the Taliban leader refused to hand the al-Qaeda over to the U. S. in order to demonstrate that he would not be a tool for the U. S. government, rather than because of his support for the al-Qaeda group. If the U. S. were indeed to retreat, it is yet to be seen whether the Taliban would be capable of coming back to full power and enforce Sharia law nationwide. However, the Taliban is currently experiencing a momentary resurgence, which is attributed to the Afghan people’s unity against the foreign (equally importantly, Christian) occupying power that the U. S. is seen as. (Cushman)This support will dwindle if this common enemy is removed. The U. S. needs to look for the roots of its problems in itself, not in others.
The U. S. is currently in Afghanistan for political motivations, and its plan to install central democracy in the country is not a prudent one. As said in Ames Cushman’s article, “Afghanistan has always been a loose conglomeration of decentralized ethnic communities that have largely ruled themselves” (Cushman). Consequently, a system of power such as central democracy is not suited for a nation with such a history. Other than governance at the local scale, the importance of religion in politics is also characteristic of Afghanistan. However, the U. S. does not respect the fact that, historically, separation of church and state has not been feasible in such a strong religious hold as this country. Instead, the U. S. only encourages radicalism as time goes on, for the war in Afghanistan is considered a jihad by many Afghanis, and by providing a sense of unity, this situation only increases the number of extremists (Cushman). Meanwhile, Karzai’s government, seen by many Afghanis to be a puppet government, reflects the will of the Afghan people often less than the Taliban does (Berger). Traditionally, local warlords or town elders held more authority over a town than even the Taliban (Cushman). These leaders were perfectly capable of providing the governance that their community needs, more so than the one-size-fits-all central government of Hamid Karzai. Unfortunately, because the U. S. fails to accept the unique situation in Afghanistan, the nation finds itself in the same situation as the Soviets years ago, entangled in a web of politics more influenced by tradition and religion rather than what the U. S. sees as social justice.
Even if the U. S. were to refocus on social and political reform, it is making the wrong kinds of efforts to help restore security in Afghanistan. Most importantly, the Afghan people need a government and military they can trust. Adam Berger states in his writing, “[Karzai’s] new government has not been able to assert control outside of the capital city Kabul, and does not have an independent army capable of protecting it” (Berger). Because this government is instead always under the protection of U. S. troops, President Karzai and his administration fail to earn the trust of the Afghan people. To promote a sense of stability and security in Afghanistan, Afghanistan needs Afghani soldiers, not American recruits. As journalists Aryn Baker and Loi Kolay suggest in their article, “U. S. soldiers have learned that to deny al-Qaeda a foothold in Afghanistan will require the establishment of a government that Afghanis can believe in, the security that allows them to support it and jobs that can provide an alternative to fighting” (Baker and Kolay). More so than anything, trust is the priority; as Captain James Howell, interviewed by TIME Magazine, says, “If we can reach a point where the [Afghan] villagers want to work with us and the Taliban are the only thing stopping them, that’s success” (Baker and Kolay). For social reform to take place, the people of Afghanistan need to want it, and in order to achieve this, they need to trust their government, as well as the help that the U. S. offers. Disregarding all of this, the U. S. -installed Karzai government falls short in comparison to the Taliban even in terms of efficiency. The most prominent example of this is the recent resurgence of the drug trade in Afghanistan. Though not a widely known fact, during the Soviet Union occupation, the U. S. first encouraged the drug trade’s kickoff in Afghanistan because drug addiction was believed to be a potential weapon against the Soviets (Berger). What the U. S. started out of convenience has grown into one of the most challenging social problems of Afghanistan in the modern day. However, while the Taliban quickly and efficiently stifled this drug trade, since the start of the U. S. occupation of Afghanistan and the Taliban’s fall from power, local warlords have again been increasing the number of poppy fields in the country year by year (Cushman). Most importantly, the U. S. shows an immense lack of consideration for the Afghani people. Many foot soldiers are in the Taliban and al-Qaeda for financial incentive, rather than because they believe in the ideology of the groups (O’Hanlon and Sherjan). People will go to great lengths in times of financial difficulties. Furthermore, through its blatant war against Sharia law, the U. S. is not taking into consideration that Afghani people have different values and a very different sense of justice than those of the Western judicial system that is pushed upon them (Cushman). As the Minister of Economy says, “What we want for Afghanistan is Islamic rights, not Western rights” (qtd. in Baker). Enforcing American ideals upon Afghanistan is not a reasonable course of action, especially when the Afghanis perceive the U. S. as an invasive nation that is undermining the dignity and rights of the Afghan people as a whole.
To solve the problems that the U. S. is now facing, education and other kinds of social reform should be funded instead. The U. S. particularly quotes abuse against women as a reason for their continued occupation, though the war in Afghanistan only encourages even more radical behavior, especially violations of women’s rights, as time goes on. Many, if not most, forms of abuse take place in homes, where American influence cannot reach; as described in a piece of work by Melanie Zoltán, according to Taliban edicts, women are required to be fully “covered from head to toe in a burqa” in public, while they are not allowed to go outside without the accompaniment of a male family member. They are also not allowed to wear the color of the Taliban flag (white) on any article of clothing, and houses and buildings with females are required to have their windows painted over. (Zoltán) But such systematic abuse cannot be made possible without the compliance of everyday Afghan males. Because such regulations are likely most strictly enforced in the home, the war the U. S. is waging, in the end, cannot truly help the women suffering from social injustice in Afghanistan. Changing the mindset of the Afghan people at this point is much too difficult. Educating the children of Afghanistan, especially about women’s rights and the need for the lessening of religious radicalism, is the only way to change the future. Instead of pointing guns at their homes and families, the U. S. should be offering chances to receive a non-radical education to the future generation of the country, the generation that really matters- children. The U. S. must show that it wants the best for the Afghani people. Is it fair to demand trust for American social workers in Afghanistan when the U. S. has soldiers stationed in the nation at the same time (Klein)? In the current situation, both the Taliban and Afghani civilians are prone to misinterpret the U. S.’s intentions. In order to justify the pursuit of its newfound goal for social reform in Afghanistan, the U. S. needs to show that it no longer holds regrets about its original purpose for occupation.
The U. S.’s original goal in invading Afghanistan has already been achieved, and for the U. S. to aid in promoting stability in the nation, it needs to withdraw its troops and support effective means of social reform instead. The excuses that the U. S. provides for its continued occupation of Afghanistan are not acceptable, for if the U. S. truly wants the best for the Afghani people, it should accept that Afghanistan is not capable of being ruled by central democracy. Afghanistan is a nation with values and traditions much different from that of the U. S., and its people need to be ruled by a government that reflects their wishes and needs. Certainly, it is an undeniable fact that Afghanistan is a humanitarian danger zone, with extreme poverty and political disorder ruling the nation, as well as a lack of recognition of women’s rights. But these problems cannot be solved- and are instead worsened- through the presence of U. S. troops in Afghanistan. If you give a fish to a man who doesn’t know how to fish, he will be content only while his stomach is full. He will be satisfied for only a moment until he is left, again, as someone who is unable to support himself. Similarly, with the U. S.’s current approach to the situation in Afghanistan, any kind of a settlement will only be a temporary truce. In order for Afghanistan to secure a more stable future for itself, this marionette of sorts needs to learn how to stand on its own two feet, and to achieve this, it must cut off its strings first.
A Research Paper by Garam Noh
Tragedy tears hearts apart on both sides. Each man fights not for the bigger ideals he represents, but for the family he has waiting back home. To earn the privilege of seeing their wives and children once again, these men will bloody their hands in a conflict that has long lost its meaning. One man has pale skin and blond hair, blue eyes. The other has dark skin, black hair, and brown eyes. They are two different men, both stereotypically representative of each of their nations. But the sorrow their eyes share is the same. This is the war in Afghanistan, a war that has made both sides suffer the consequences of meaningless violence, a war fought by two troops that have both lost sight of their original goal. Today, both nations cannot see that what they are searching for can no longer be found through this bloodshed. The war in Afghanistan, a pursuit that has already been fulfilled, should be abandoned to make way for more effective social reform.
As Adam Berger says in his article, “Afghanistan: An Overview,” terrorism’s roots in Afghanistan can be traced back to the Soviet Union and the war on communism. In December of 1979, the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan, killing the Afghan president and forcibly setting up a new government. The U. S. helped the Afghan resistance movement fight the Soviet Union, fearing the Soviet empire would extend its reaches even further into South Asia. But what was a political war for the U. S. was a religious one for the Afghanis. (Berger) The Afghani fighters considered themselves Mujahideen, or those who take part in holy war, and the struggle against the atheist Soviet Union was dubbed a “jihad,” or “a war for religious reasons or motivations” (Berger). This gave the Afghanis a sense of solidarity and a common goal. With the help of both indigenous and foreign forces, as well as ample international funding, Afghanistan won the struggle. But this war was what left Afghanistan disorganized, and allowed the birth of terrorist organizations on Afghan soil, such as Osama bin Laden’s group, the al-Qaeda. This terrorist organization began when foreign soldiers who had taken part in the effort against the Soviets came together, while the international funding that its members enjoyed during and after the war gave the group the means to settle down on Afghan land. To understand the war in Afghanistan today, one must understand that the motivations for the war came into existence years ago, and that the obstacles the Soviets faced in their conquest then are what American soldiers face today. (Berger)
The aftermath of Afghanistan’s struggle against the Soviet Union mutated into the War on Terror in Afghanistan today. As Adam Berger mentions in “Afghanistan: An Overview,” after the Soviet Union retreated, civil disorder ensued, giving the Taliban an advantage when they first came into power- as factions of the Mujahideen struggled for power in the newly freed Afghan government, the Taliban emerged triumphant (Berger). As Adam Berger wrote in his article, “By 1996, the Taliban was in control of most of the country, enforcing its conservative interpretation of Islamic law.” Meanwhile, the al-Qaeda, led by the infamous Osama bin Laden, instead focused on the goal of “ridding Muslim nations of what they considered to have been corrupting foreign influences.” (Berger) Berger claims that only since the Soviet Union had retreated from Afghan soil did the U. S. became the al-Qaeda’s main target, leading up to the devastating terrorist attacks on both New York and Washington D. C. on September 11th, 2001 (Berger). To protect national security and take punitive measures for the tragedy that September, the U. S. demanded that the Taliban hand over the al-Qaeda members under their protection, but the Taliban refused (qtd. in Berger). Consequently, the U. S. launched Operation Enduring Freedom on October 7th, 2001, with the goal of ousting the Taliban regime and uprooting the al-Qaeda empire in Afghanistan (Berger). The Anti-Taliban Northern Alliance, with support from the U. S. -led coalition, drove the Taliban from the nation’s capital by December of the same year (qtd. in Berger). In 2004, Hamid Karzai, an Afghani, was democratically elected the president of the country, though only in name; the new democratic government, instilled by the influence of the U. S., has limited power only in the capital city of Kabul, and the does not even have “an independent army capable of protecting it” (Berger). In fact, the central government’s power only dwindles the further one gets from the capital, and the “Taliban has seen a resurgence, both in terms of popularity and military might.” The Taliban have this advantage because they are indigenous, and because they respect the fact that Afghanistan has traditionally been largely governed on the local scale. The U. S. still remains today mainly to eradicate the Taliban completely from Afghanistan, a country whose citizens in fact prefer the Taliban to the U. S. -supported government. (Cushman) As a fallback, the U. S. also claims that it is fighting the social injustices against women encouraged by Sharia law (Zoltán). But we need to ask ourselves: Does the war the U. S. is currently fighting call for the use of bullets and weaponry, or that of social reform and education?
It is imperative for the U. S. to realize that its invasion of Afghanistan has already reached its goal, and that it has lost sight of its original purpose for occupying the country. In fact, the al-Qaeda has largely lost its influence in Afghanistan, though indeed the U. S. has still failed to locate many high-level al-Qaeda leaders and operatives (Berger). For about a decade, the U. S. has barely made any progress, and it is now foolish to think that this state of stagnancy will change in the future. As Ames Cushman states in his article, “Counterpoint: The U. S. Should Withdraw its Military from Afghanistan,” the only opposing force against the U. S. that remains in Afghanistan is the Taliban, which does not demonstrate any wish to retaliate, but instead expresses its wishes for a peaceful resolution to this war. The Taliban, too, was driven from “main population centers” by mid-December 2001, and “have… repeatedly stated that they have no interest in exporting terrorism or waging jihad beyond their borders if foreign forces leave” (Cushman). The al-Qaeda and the Taliban are not one and the same, and definitely are not interchangeable terms. Though many people were under the impression that the al-Qaeda was acting in accordance with the Taliban’s wishes, “the al-Qaeda operations and training network operated more at the sufferance of the Taliban than at the direction of it…” (Cushman) In fact, the U.S.’s invasion may not have even taken place if not for the Taliban’s pride: the Taliban leader refused to hand the al-Qaeda over to the U. S. in order to demonstrate that he would not be a tool for the U. S. government, rather than because of his support for the al-Qaeda group. If the U. S. were indeed to retreat, it is yet to be seen whether the Taliban would be capable of coming back to full power and enforce Sharia law nationwide. However, the Taliban is currently experiencing a momentary resurgence, which is attributed to the Afghan people’s unity against the foreign (equally importantly, Christian) occupying power that the U. S. is seen as. (Cushman)This support will dwindle if this common enemy is removed. The U. S. needs to look for the roots of its problems in itself, not in others.
The U. S. is currently in Afghanistan for political motivations, and its plan to install central democracy in the country is not a prudent one. As said in Ames Cushman’s article, “Afghanistan has always been a loose conglomeration of decentralized ethnic communities that have largely ruled themselves” (Cushman). Consequently, a system of power such as central democracy is not suited for a nation with such a history. Other than governance at the local scale, the importance of religion in politics is also characteristic of Afghanistan. However, the U. S. does not respect the fact that, historically, separation of church and state has not been feasible in such a strong religious hold as this country. Instead, the U. S. only encourages radicalism as time goes on, for the war in Afghanistan is considered a jihad by many Afghanis, and by providing a sense of unity, this situation only increases the number of extremists (Cushman). Meanwhile, Karzai’s government, seen by many Afghanis to be a puppet government, reflects the will of the Afghan people often less than the Taliban does (Berger). Traditionally, local warlords or town elders held more authority over a town than even the Taliban (Cushman). These leaders were perfectly capable of providing the governance that their community needs, more so than the one-size-fits-all central government of Hamid Karzai. Unfortunately, because the U. S. fails to accept the unique situation in Afghanistan, the nation finds itself in the same situation as the Soviets years ago, entangled in a web of politics more influenced by tradition and religion rather than what the U. S. sees as social justice.
Even if the U. S. were to refocus on social and political reform, it is making the wrong kinds of efforts to help restore security in Afghanistan. Most importantly, the Afghan people need a government and military they can trust. Adam Berger states in his writing, “[Karzai’s] new government has not been able to assert control outside of the capital city Kabul, and does not have an independent army capable of protecting it” (Berger). Because this government is instead always under the protection of U. S. troops, President Karzai and his administration fail to earn the trust of the Afghan people. To promote a sense of stability and security in Afghanistan, Afghanistan needs Afghani soldiers, not American recruits. As journalists Aryn Baker and Loi Kolay suggest in their article, “U. S. soldiers have learned that to deny al-Qaeda a foothold in Afghanistan will require the establishment of a government that Afghanis can believe in, the security that allows them to support it and jobs that can provide an alternative to fighting” (Baker and Kolay). More so than anything, trust is the priority; as Captain James Howell, interviewed by TIME Magazine, says, “If we can reach a point where the [Afghan] villagers want to work with us and the Taliban are the only thing stopping them, that’s success” (Baker and Kolay). For social reform to take place, the people of Afghanistan need to want it, and in order to achieve this, they need to trust their government, as well as the help that the U. S. offers. Disregarding all of this, the U. S. -installed Karzai government falls short in comparison to the Taliban even in terms of efficiency. The most prominent example of this is the recent resurgence of the drug trade in Afghanistan. Though not a widely known fact, during the Soviet Union occupation, the U. S. first encouraged the drug trade’s kickoff in Afghanistan because drug addiction was believed to be a potential weapon against the Soviets (Berger). What the U. S. started out of convenience has grown into one of the most challenging social problems of Afghanistan in the modern day. However, while the Taliban quickly and efficiently stifled this drug trade, since the start of the U. S. occupation of Afghanistan and the Taliban’s fall from power, local warlords have again been increasing the number of poppy fields in the country year by year (Cushman). Most importantly, the U. S. shows an immense lack of consideration for the Afghani people. Many foot soldiers are in the Taliban and al-Qaeda for financial incentive, rather than because they believe in the ideology of the groups (O’Hanlon and Sherjan). People will go to great lengths in times of financial difficulties. Furthermore, through its blatant war against Sharia law, the U. S. is not taking into consideration that Afghani people have different values and a very different sense of justice than those of the Western judicial system that is pushed upon them (Cushman). As the Minister of Economy says, “What we want for Afghanistan is Islamic rights, not Western rights” (qtd. in Baker). Enforcing American ideals upon Afghanistan is not a reasonable course of action, especially when the Afghanis perceive the U. S. as an invasive nation that is undermining the dignity and rights of the Afghan people as a whole.
To solve the problems that the U. S. is now facing, education and other kinds of social reform should be funded instead. The U. S. particularly quotes abuse against women as a reason for their continued occupation, though the war in Afghanistan only encourages even more radical behavior, especially violations of women’s rights, as time goes on. Many, if not most, forms of abuse take place in homes, where American influence cannot reach; as described in a piece of work by Melanie Zoltán, according to Taliban edicts, women are required to be fully “covered from head to toe in a burqa” in public, while they are not allowed to go outside without the accompaniment of a male family member. They are also not allowed to wear the color of the Taliban flag (white) on any article of clothing, and houses and buildings with females are required to have their windows painted over. (Zoltán) But such systematic abuse cannot be made possible without the compliance of everyday Afghan males. Because such regulations are likely most strictly enforced in the home, the war the U. S. is waging, in the end, cannot truly help the women suffering from social injustice in Afghanistan. Changing the mindset of the Afghan people at this point is much too difficult. Educating the children of Afghanistan, especially about women’s rights and the need for the lessening of religious radicalism, is the only way to change the future. Instead of pointing guns at their homes and families, the U. S. should be offering chances to receive a non-radical education to the future generation of the country, the generation that really matters- children. The U. S. must show that it wants the best for the Afghani people. Is it fair to demand trust for American social workers in Afghanistan when the U. S. has soldiers stationed in the nation at the same time (Klein)? In the current situation, both the Taliban and Afghani civilians are prone to misinterpret the U. S.’s intentions. In order to justify the pursuit of its newfound goal for social reform in Afghanistan, the U. S. needs to show that it no longer holds regrets about its original purpose for occupation.
The U. S.’s original goal in invading Afghanistan has already been achieved, and for the U. S. to aid in promoting stability in the nation, it needs to withdraw its troops and support effective means of social reform instead. The excuses that the U. S. provides for its continued occupation of Afghanistan are not acceptable, for if the U. S. truly wants the best for the Afghani people, it should accept that Afghanistan is not capable of being ruled by central democracy. Afghanistan is a nation with values and traditions much different from that of the U. S., and its people need to be ruled by a government that reflects their wishes and needs. Certainly, it is an undeniable fact that Afghanistan is a humanitarian danger zone, with extreme poverty and political disorder ruling the nation, as well as a lack of recognition of women’s rights. But these problems cannot be solved- and are instead worsened- through the presence of U. S. troops in Afghanistan. If you give a fish to a man who doesn’t know how to fish, he will be content only while his stomach is full. He will be satisfied for only a moment until he is left, again, as someone who is unable to support himself. Similarly, with the U. S.’s current approach to the situation in Afghanistan, any kind of a settlement will only be a temporary truce. In order for Afghanistan to secure a more stable future for itself, this marionette of sorts needs to learn how to stand on its own two feet, and to achieve this, it must cut off its strings first.